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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-!MPORT-mORT CLAUSE-VALIDI'IY OF A STATB
Gnoss RECEIPTS TAX ON CoMMON CARRIERS TRANSPORTING IMPORTS AND

ExPonTs-The State of Maryland levied a nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax
on revenues of common carriers operating within the state, apportioned on the
basis of trackage within Maryland to trackage everywhere. Petitioners, who
are common carriers operating within Maryland, objected to this tax to the
extent that it constituted a tax on gross receipts derived from transporting imports and exports on the grounds that it violated the import-export clause. 1
The court of appeals of Maryland declared the tax valid. On appeal, held,
affirmed.2 Where the tax is on an activity connected with the import or export
of goods, rather than on the goods themselves, the constitutional immunity stops
at the water's edge.3 Canton Railroad Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 71 S.Ct.
447 (1951); Western Maryland Railway Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 520, 71 S.Ct.
450 (1951).

1 "No State shall, without the consent of the Congress levy any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
Laws••••" U.S. CoNST., Art. I, §IO, cl. 2.
2 Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter reserved judgment.
3 There is no real question of validity under the commerce clause because the tax is
apportioned. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 S.Ct. 1260 (1948).
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The intent of the framers of the Constitution in adopting the import-export
clause probably was to keep coastal states with good harbors from utilizing their
advantageous location to exact a toll from the products going to or coming from
inland states. To be effective, this clause must be construed broadly enough to
prevent a state from avoiding the prohibition by placing the tax burden on an
indispensable activity connected with the import or export. Recognizing this,
the Court at an early date invalidated the exaction of a license fee for the privilege of selling imports within the taxing state.4 The fee was found to be tantamount to a tax on the imports themselves and therefore invalid. Likewise, sales
and excise taxes on the transfer of title or possession have been found to be
actually a tax on the goods. 5 Stamp taxes on foreign bills of lading and on policies insuring exports against maritime risks have also been invalidated for the
same reason. 6 In the present cases, the Court felt that the tax was not tantamount to a tax on the imports and exports; that it constituted only a tax on an
activity connected with them; and that the immunity should stop at the water's
edge, for otherwise a zone of tax immunity never before imagined or intended would be created. It is submitted that the decisions cannot be justified
on this ground. It has long been recognized for commerce clause purposes
that a gross receipts tax on the revenues of an interstate carrier is invalid
unless fairly apportioned to business done within the taxing state, because
the tax incidence falls as a direct burden on the commerce.7 If the present tax
were not apportioned it would be invalid by virtue of the commerce clause.
If this is recognized as a direct tax on the goods for commerce clause purposes,
it seems strange that it is not also a direct tax on the goods for purposes of the
import-export clause, which does not leave the restrictions on the states to
implication, but expressly forbids them to tax imports and exports. Nor can
the decisions be justified on the same basis that allows the tax under the commerce clause. The rationale of the scope of the commerce clause is to maintain an area of trade free from state interference, which immunity is implied
from giving the control of commerce to Congress, and at the same time to make
the commerce pay its own way as long as the purpose of the clause is not defeated. The scope of the import-export clause cannot be limited by this policy
of balancing of local and national interests, for it expressly declares that imports
and exports are immune from state taxation. Exceptions cannot be validly
implied for they would defeat the purpose of the clause. Adopting this view,

4Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827).
5 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69, 67 S.Ct. 156 (1946); Spalding &
Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 43 S.Ct. 485 (1923).
6 Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 34 S.Ct. 496
(1915); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 21 S.Ct. 648 (1901); Almy v. California, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 169 (1860).
7Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 142 U.S. 217, 12 S.Ct. 121 (1891); Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 7 S.Ct. 1118 (1887);
Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230, 7 S.Ct. 857 (1887).
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the Court has held that a sales tax on exports, though properly allocated to a
local event and valid under the commerce clause, cannot be sustained under
the import-export clause. 8 • The prime motivation for the present decisions is
that the tax immunity thus created would be too large to be desirable. However, the tax immunity would be no greater than that recognized in prior decisions, and it is not as if there are no limitations at all. The "original package"9
and "goods committed to export"10 doctrines define "import" and "export" so
that at the present time the tax immunity is kept within reasonable bounds without the restrictive doctrine of the present cases.
Roger D. Anderson, S.Ed.

s Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, supra note 5.
9 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 65 S.Ct. 870 (1945); May v. New
Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 29 S.Ct. 976 (1900); Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 29
(1871); Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 110 (1868); Brown v. Maryland,
supra note 4.
10 Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced County, 337 U.S. 154, 69 S.Ct. 995 (1949); Joy
Oil Co.
State Tax Commission, 337 U.S. 286, 69 S.Ct. 1075 (1949); Richfield Oil
Corp. v. State Board, supra note 5.
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